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STATF OF UTAH, 
in t i f f-Re spond e n t , 
\ r 
DANIEL 
D e f e n d a n t - A p p e l l a n t . 
Case 
rvu. 2 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON PETITION FOR REHEARING 
•resented m i lie S t a t *•• *«. ^ L . * for 
rehearing is whether the Court oveiiunun .,t i 
S£3iixA- v * United States, 46 8 (19 84) 
>lated ic fourth amendment, 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Daniel B. Northrup, was charged with three 
counts 
substance un<*" 
(a mended 19 87) 
:rolled 
§ 58-3 
Lternatively 
arranging 
UTAH CODE ANN. 
agreeing, or 
stance under 
(1986) (amended 19B E> 
JL W J L U I J count? - unlawful possessio: ; 
controlled substance * 
5 8 - 3 7 - 8 ( 1 ) ( a ) ( i i ) (R. 2 3 - 2 6 ) . ftltei a bench t i i a l , i he c o u r t , 
ounts against defendar . 
im guilty 
distribut ,aj legre* £elony) , one count of 
unlaw i -m v ' v * * * *^* ~ t 
distribute value (a second degree felon} n- , i f 
unlawful possession of a controlled substance (a class A 
misdemeanor) (R. 79-81, 443-44)* The court then sentenced 
defendant to concurrent prison and jail terms of one to fifteen 
years, zero to five years, and one year, and fined him one 
thousand dollars, but stayed execution of the prison and jail 
sentences and placed him on probation (R. 79-82). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The State agrees with the fact statement s e t forth in 
the Court's opinion in State v. Northrup, 83 Utah Adv. Rep. 28, 
29 , P.2d , (1988) . For purposes of t h i s p e t i t i o n , a 
c r i t i c a l f a c t i s tha t , once ins ide the res idence , the o f f i c e r s 
observed contraband but did not s e i z e any evidence and simply 
secured the premises and occupants u n t i l a search warrant arrived 
approximately two and one-half hours l a t e r (R. 124-25 , 1 7 1 ) . 
Northrup, 83 Utah Adv. Rep. a t 29 . The o f f i c e r s conducted the 
pat-down of defendant pursuant to the securing of the premises 
and i t s occupants. Haid* 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In rul ing that the pat-down search of defendant 
v i o l a t e d the fourth amendment, t h i s Court appears to have 
overlooked the f i r s t holding of Sequra v. United S t a t e s , 468 U.S. 
796 (1984) , which sanctioned the se izure (impoundment) of the 
defendants1 apartment by o f f i c e r s awaiting a search warrant, even 
though the o f f i c e r s 1 i n i t i a l entry was i l l e g a l . Therefore, the 
Court should grant rehearing and determine whether Seoura's f i r s t 
holding j u s t i f i e s the admission of the pat-down evidence at 
defendant's t r i a l . 
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INTRODUCTION 
This petition for rehearing is submitted pursuant to 
Utah R. Ct. App. 35. In Brown v. Pickard, denying reh'g* 4 Utah 
292, 11 P. 512 (1886)
 r the Utah Supreme Court set forth the 
standard for determining whether a petition for rehearing should 
be granted: 
[T]o justify a rehearing, a strong case must 
be made. We must be convinced that the court 
failed to consider some material point in the 
case, or that it erred in its conclusions, or 
that some matter has been discovered which 
was unknown at the time of the hearing. 
4 Utah at 294, 11 P. at 512 (citation omitted). In Cummings v. 
Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 129 P. 619 (1913), the Supreme Court 
stated: 
To make an application for rehearing is a 
matter of right, and we have no desire to 
discourage the practice of filing petitions 
for rehearings in proper cases. When this 
court, however, has considered and decided 
all of the material questions involved in a 
case, a rehearing should not be applied for, 
unless we have misconstrued or overlooked 
some material fact or facts, or have 
overlooked some statute or decision which may 
affect the result, or that we have based the 
decision on some wrong principle of law, or 
have either misapplied or overlooked 
something which materially affects the 
result. . . . If there are some reasons, 
however, such as we have indicated above, or 
other good reasons, a petition for a 
rehearing should be promptly filed and, if it 
is meritorious, its form will in no case be 
scrutinized by this court. 
42 Utah at 173-73, 129 P. at 624. The argument portion of this 
brief will demonstrate that, based on these standards, the 
State's petition for rehearing is properly before the Court and 
should be granted. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIS COURT APPEARS TO HAVE OVERLOOKED THE 
FIRST HOLDING OF SEGURA V. UNITED STATES IN 
RULING THAT THE PAT-DOWN SEARCH OF DEFENDANT 
VIOLATED THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, 
In rul ing that the pat-down search of defendant and the 
se i zure of the evidence money from his person v io la ted the fourth 
amendment because they were ta inted by the i l l e g a l entry , 
Northrup, 83 Utah Adv. Rep. at 32-33, the Court appears to have 
overlooked the first holding of Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 
796 (1984). In Segura, the Supreme Courtf when deciding the 
issue of whether an earlier illegal entry required suppression of 
evidence seized later pursuant to a valid search warrant, 
addressed two separate questions and set forth two distinct 
holdings. The following passage makes this clear: 
Resolution of this issue requires us to 
consider two separate questions: first, 
whether the entry and internal securing of 
the premises constituted an impermissible 
seizure of all the contents of the apartment, 
seen and unseen; second, whether the evidence 
first discovered during the search of the 
apartment pursuant to a valid warrant issued 
the day after the entry should have been 
suppressed as MfruitM of the illegal entry. 
Our disposition of both questions is 
carefully limited. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the District 
Court1s holding that there were no exigent 
circumstances to justify the warrantless 
entry into petitioners' apartment. That 
issue is not before us, and we have no reason 
to question the courts1 holding that that 
search was illegal. The ensuing interference 
with petitioners1 possessory interests in 
their apartment, however, is another matter. 
On this first question, we conclude that, 
assuming that there was a seizure of all the 
contents of the petitioners1 apartment when 
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agents secured the premises from within, that 
seizure did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 
Specifically^ we hold that where officers, 
having probable cause, enter premises, and 
with probable cause, arrest the occupants who 
have legitimate possessory interests in its 
contents and take them into custody and, fot 
no more than the period here involved, secure 
the premises from within to preserve the 
status quo while others, in good faith, are 
in the process of obtaining a warrant, they 
do not violate the Fourth Amendment's 
proscription against unreasonable seizures. 
The illegality of the initial entry, as we 
will show, has no bearing on the second 
question. The resolution of this second 
question requires that we determine whether 
the initial entry tainted the discovery of 
the evidence now challenged. On this issue, 
we hold that the evidence discovered during 
the subsequent search of the apartment the 
following day pursuant to the valid search 
warrant issued wholly on information known to 
the officers before the entry into the 
apartment need not have been suppressed as 
"fruit" of the illegal entry because the 
warrant and the information on which it was 
based were unrelated to the entry and 
therefore constituted an independent source 
for the evidence under Silverthorne Lumber 
Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920). 
468 U.S. at 798-99 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original). 
This language represents Part I of the majority opinion, in which 
all five of the majority justices joined. See 468 U.S. at 797. 
£££ £LS& 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure. § 6.5(c) at 673-74 
(1987) (hereafter -LaFave11). £f. Vnited States V, Curry, 751 
F.2d 442, 447 n. 3 (1st Cir. 1984) (observing that M[i]t is not 
altogether clear how much of the opinion's [first] holding!] a 
majority of the Justices joined-). 
In the instant case, the Court was required to consider 
the application of both of the Segura holdings. It correctly 
ruled that the admissibility of the evidence seized pursuant to 
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the unchallenged warrant was contro l led by Segura's second 
holding. Northrup, 83 Utah Adv. Rep. at 3 1 . 1 Howeverf the Court 
did not d i scuss the appl icat ion of Segura's f i r s t holding—which 
d e a l t with the l e g a l i t y of the impoundment of Segura's 
apartment—to the f a c t s of defendant's case . Although the Segura 
opinion i s somewhat confusing on t h i s po in t , i t seems inescapable 
that f i v e j u s t i c e s agreed that the se izure of Segura's apartment 
for the time necessary to obtain a warrant did not violate the 
fourth amendment, even assuming that the initial entry was 
illegal. The following language from Part I of the opinion 
requires that conclusion: 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the District 
Court's holding that there were no exigent 
circumstances to justify the warrantless 
entry into petitioners' apartment. That 
issue is not before us, and we have no reason 
to question the courts' holding that that 
search was illegal. The ensuing interference 
with petitioners' possessory interests in 
their apartment, however, is another matter. 
On this first question, we conclude that, 
assuming that there was a seizure of all the 
contents of petitioners' apartment when 
agents secured the premises from within, that 
seizure did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 
468 U.S. at 798 (emphasis in original). And, although the 
elaboration upon and explanation of Segura's first holding which 
* In its opinion, the Court wrote: 
Absent a challenge to the warrant or any 
reliable evidence that the warrant was based 
upon independent information, we must assume 
the warrant was valid and based upon 
information independent of the illegal entry. 
83 Utah Adv. Rep. at 31. Presumably, the Court meant to say that 
"laJbsent a challenge to the warrant or any reliable evidence 
that the warrant was [not] based upon independent information . . 
M 
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appear in Part IV of the opinion (468 U.S. at 805-13) were 
embraced by only Chief Justice Burger and Justice O'Connor, the 
holding expressed in Part I still stands. See LaFave, at 674. 
One can speculate as to the meaning of the split in the majority 
justices on Parts I and IV of the opinion, ±sL. at 674-76, but the 
first holding expressly stated in Part I cannot simply be 
ignored.^ 
Rather than analyzing the possible application of 
Segura's first holding to the facts of defendant's case (where an 
impoundment clearly occurred), this Court discussed the 
application of the "independent source" and "inevitable 
discovery" doctrines to the pat-down search, neither of which 
were argued by the State. The Court correctly concluded that 
neither doctrine provided a basis for admitting the pat-down 
evidence. Northrup, 83 Utah Adv. Rep. at 32-33. In rejecting 
the State's argument that the pat-down evidence was admissible 
under Sequra and State v. Roybal, 716 P.2d 291, 292-94 (Utah 
In its responsive brief, the State erroneously characterized 
part IV of Segura as an "alternative holding," Br. of Resp. at 
21, and this Court appears to have treated it as such. See 
Northrup, 83 Utah Adv. Rep. at 33 n. 6. In oral argument, the 
State sought to correct the error, emphasizing that Part IV 
merely contained the reasoning that two of the majority justices 
thought supported the first holding in Part I. It is not clear 
why the other three majority justices did not agree with the 
reasoning of Part IV, or what reasoning they would have adopted 
instead. However, nothing in the majority opinion even suggests 
that those three justices did not wholly concur in the first 
holding of Part I. 
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1986) (citing Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1 (1968) ) ,3 the Court 
stated that "we do not believe that the seizure can be 
legitimized by a 'stop and frisk1 theory under Terry . . . 
because the officers were illegally on the premises and may not 
benefit by 'exploitation of that illegality.•" id., at 33 n. 8 
(emphasis added). The problem with that conclusion is that it 
does not take into account Segura's first holding, which made 
clear that the seizure (impoundment) of Segura's apartment did 
not violate the fourth amendment, despite the illegal entry. To 
dispose of the State's argument, this Court must either (1) 
reject Segura's first holding in Part I as a holding adopted by a 
majority of the Supreme Court; or (2) accept the first holding as 
a majority ruling, but determine that an impoundment like that 
which occurred in Segura did not occur here; or (3) accept 
Seoura's first holding as controlling law, but find that 
impoundment of the residence could not legally include the 
J
 This argument was most clearly stated during oral argument--
i.e., that the pat-down of defendant was justified as a component 
of the impoundment (seizure) of the premises and persons within, 
the action taken by the officers to preserve the status quo until 
a search warrant could be obtained. 
On this point, the Court's statement that "Itlhe State does not 
contend that the evidence seized in the pat-down was admissible 
if the initial entry was illegal," Northrup. 83 Utah Adv. Rep. at 
33 n. 6, is somewhat confusing. The State's brief, Br. of Resp. 
at 17-22, and oral argument obviously sought an affirmance of the 
trial court's ruling on the pat-down evidence even if the Court 
were to find the initial entry illegal for want of exigent 
circumstances. Indeed, the Court appears to recognize the 
State's position in the sentence in footnote 6 immediately 
following the statement just quoted. 
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detent ion and pat-down of defendant under the circumstances. 
Discussion of these quest ions i s conspicuously absent from t h i s 
Court's opinion. Because they are c r i t i c a l to a prec i se 
re so lu t ion of the fourth amendment i s sue presented here, the 
State urges the Court to grant rehearing and s p e c i f i c a l l y address 
the pos s ib l e appl icat ion of Segura's f i r s t holding to the f a c t s 
of defendant's ca se . The S t a t e , of course, does not abandon i t s 
p o s i t i o n that the t r i a l c o u r t ' s admission of the pat-down 
evidence was j u s t i f i e d under that holding and the reasoning of 
Rgybal* 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing d i s c u s s i o n , i t appears the Court 
in State v. Northrup e i ther overlooked or misapprehended 
contro l l ing fourth amendment authority in reversing the t r i a l 
c o u r t ' s denial of defendant's motion to suppress the pat-down 
evidence . Therefore, the S t a t e ' s p e t i t i o n for rehearing should 
be granted, and the Court should e i ther modify i t s opinion and 
affirm the t r i a l c o u r t ' s ruling without further argument or 
* In i t s responsive brief and in oral argument, the State 
contended that the detent ion and pat-down search were permiss ible 
elements of the impoundment of the suspect res idence . Br. of 
Resp. at 15-16. Those arguments and the cases c i t e d w i l l not be 
repeated here. The State acknowledges that Seguya does not 
s e t t l e the quest ion of whether impoundment of premises may 
lawful ly include the detent ion and search of persons on the 
premises . See LaFave, at 675. Resort to other case law i s 
necessary. 
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restore the case to the calendar for reargument or resubmission. 
Utah R. Ct. App. 35(c) .5 
The State certifies that this petition is presented in 
good faith and not for delay.
 lA^ 
RESPECTFULLY submitted thi u &> day of June, 1988. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
DAVID B. THOMPSON / 
Special Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of 
the foregoing Petition for Rehearing were mailed, postage 
prepaid, to David L. Grindstaff, attorney for appellant, 395 
South 600 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, this _£^l™day of 
June, 1988. 
^J^^^^C v^ ^ ^ > i ^ ^ ^ ^ 
5
 The wisdom of Segura's first holding is not at issue here. 
Much of the criticism leveled by the dissenters in Segura appears 
to be well taken. However, neither the State nor this Court is 
in a position to disavow a majority ruling of the Supreme Court 
when a fourth amendment question is presented. Because Segura's 
first holding is subject to serious criticism, this case would 
have been a prime candidate for independent treatment under 
article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution. See State v. 
Earl, 716 P.2d 803, 805-06 (Utah 1986); State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 
264, 271-73 (Utah 1985) (Zimmerman, J., concurring separately). 
However, as this Court noted, defendant chose not to make any 
state constitutional argument and therefore that issue was not 
addressed. Northrup. 83 Utah Adv. Rep. at 29 n. 4. 
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